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Negotiating Positive Non-Interventionism: Regulating Hong Kong’s Finance 
Companies 1976-861 
Catherine R. Schenk 
Accepted for publication in China Quarterly (2017) 
The principle of Positive Non-Interventionism coined by Hong Kong’s Financial 
Secretary Sir Philip Haddon-Cave in the 1970s has come to dominate perceptions 
of Hong Kong’s successful post-war economic development.  The deliberate 
effort by the state not to intervene in the allocation of productive resources, but 
instead to rely on market forces drew plaudits from free-market enthusiasts 
such as Milton Friedman in the 1980s and was a marked contrast to the 
‘governed market’ that prevailed in other East Asian newly industrialising 
economies such as South Korea and Taiwan.2  The death of positive non-
interventionism has been announced several times: as early as 1992 by Financial 
Secretary Hamish Macleod, then by Chief Executive Donald Tsang in September 
2006 and again in August 2015 by his successor Leung Chun-ying. 3 The slogan 
has persisted despite a turn to ‘big market-small government’ in the mid-2000s. 
 
The extent of liberal market norms in colonial Hong Kong, however, has been 
challenged: after all, the state held important powers over the distribution of 
land, subsidised housing (and therefore real disposable income) and from the 
                                                        
1 Part of this research was done while the author was Research Fellow at the Hong Kong Institute 
for Monetary Research and it was supported by ESRC Grant RES-062-23-2423. 
2 Friedman 1997. Friedman 2006. 
3 Macleod quoted in Staley 1994. Tsang 2006. Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying quoted in South 
China Morning Post, 15 August 2015. Cheung 2010.   
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1970s became more active in providing a range of social services.4  Even 
Haddon-Cave drew a distinction at the time between laissez-faire and non-
interventionism, noting that there was a positive role for government where 
market failure existed, i.e. when the public good was not served by unfettered 
market forces.5  Goodstadt (2005, 5) has claimed that rather than promoting a 
competitive environment, non-interventionism left the Hong Kong public ripe to 
be exploited by ‘business cartels and other anticompetitive practices’. For him, 
the banking system was a prime example where this monopoly power was 
exercised, particularly by HSBC.  But the dynamics of the relationship between 
the government and banking elites remains to be fully explored.   
 
Financial regulation is a particularly interesting sector to test positive non-
interventionism.  The international financial centre became a crucial part of 
Hong Kong’s economy during this period due to low tax and open capital 
markets.  At the same time, open markets meant that this part of the economy 
was vulnerable to global influences beyond the state’s control.  Moreover, the 
Hong Kong case is important to understand the components of effective 
regulatory reform.  While many states struggled with banking regulation in the 
new era of integrating capital market in the 1970s, Hong Kong carved its own 
path to establish a regional and then global international financial centre, in the 
absence of deposit insurance (until 2010) or a central bank (the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority was formed in 1993). To what extent was the success of 
                                                        
4 Cheung 2000. Ma 2009. Chan 2011.  
5 Haddon-Cave 1980. 
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Hong Kong’s international financial centre due to Hong Kong’s distinctive policy 
stance? 
 
There is a growing literature on the history of Hong Kong’s banking and 
monetary systems, but it has tended to focus on established banks6 and either 
ignore or engage superficially the non-bank financial sector.7  Chesterton and 
Ghose (1998, 2) describe a sub-set of DTCs in their review of merchant banks in 
Hong Kong, noting that ‘it is perhaps easier to comprehend rather than to define 
merchant banking’.   Goodstadt (2007, 171-174) traced the origins of non-bank 
Deposit Taking Companies (DTCs) to the intensification of regulation and anti-
competitive measures in the mid-1960s, but does not pursue in detail the 
implications of this development.   Greenwood (2008, 60-61) draws parallels 
between the fringe banking crisis in the City of London in 1973-4 and the Hong 
Kong banking crisis of 1982-3.  The similarities include the vulnerability of 
inadequately capitalised financial institutions to volatile property markets, the 
surge of monetary and credit expansion that preceded these crises and the sharp 
rise in interest rates that prompted illiquidity and collapse of ‘fringe’ financial 
institutions. But the non-banking sector is not central to Greenwood’s critique of 
the monetary policy in the 1970s.   
 
From the 1950s the Hong Kong colonial state had autonomy from London over 
most legislation, including financial services.8  The Bank of England was invited 
                                                        
6 The classic account is Jao 1974.  Ghose 1987. 
7 An exception is Chesterton and Ghose 1998.  
8 Goodstadt 2005, 49-70. 
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to give advice in times of crisis in the 1960s and 1980s, but London showed little 
interest in Hong Kong’s financial system in the 1970s.  Nor did Hong Kong’s 
Governors; the Financial Secretary was the key state actor. But local autonomy 
was constrained because the state relied on the private sector to help design 
policy, particularly in banking through the Exchange Banks’ Association, the 
Banking Advisory Group and advice from individual banks. 9  Nevertheless, the 
struggle over financial regulation described below shows that the state was not 
always captured by bankers.  It thus challenges corporatist interpretations of the 
Hong Kong state that emphasize shared interests of government and business.  
Ma (2016, 249) has argued that in the post-war years corporatism was ‘informal, 
not well institutionalised and relatively restricted’ but was used to ‘maintain 
legitimacy and stability’.  Goodstadt (2003, 195), on the other hand makes the 
case that by the 1970s, the influence of business elites in colonial government 
receded because labour and welfare representatives were increasingly 
appointed to Hong Kong’s governing councils.  Looking beyond the public 
arguments in the Legislative and Executive Councils to the internal 
correspondence between elites and the Financial Secretary demonstrates that 
relations between the state and bankers were close and that bankers expected 
their views to be influential.  But these negotiations over non-interventionism 
also demonstrate the limits of informal elite influence during the 1970s and early 
1980s.  
 
                                                        
9 Schenk 2003. 
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This paper uses new archival evidence to address a historic episode in which a 
rapid rise of non-bank financial intermediation had a complex impact on Hong 
Kong’s financial system in the hey-day of positive non-interventionism.  This 
evidence reveals how incumbent banks unsuccessfully lobbied the Financial 
Secretary to curtail the operations of competitors to protect their funding base. 
When new regulations were finally (and reluctantly) introduced in 1981, they 
squeezed DTCs out of the retail deposit sector, but they did not prevent the 
interlinked bank and non-bank sector from contributing to a series of banking 
and financial crises.  Incomplete and piecemeal interventions and weak 
implementation created damaging distortions that culminated in fresh 
legislation in 1986, inspired by Bank of England advice, not local interest groups.   
 
Regulations create opportunities for finance companies 1964-73  
From 1948, institutions that used the title ‘bank’ to solicit deposits from the 
public had to register with the Financial Secretariat and pay a license fee.10  But 
prudential supervision was almost completely absent until the banking crises of 
1961 and 1965.  As noted by Goodstadt and Schenk, the turning point in the 
introduction of financial repression in Hong Kong was the 1961 banking crisis in 
which several established banks suffered liquidity and solvency shocks that 
destabilised the rest of the banking system.  The diagnosis was that there were 
too many banks and that a hyper-competitive environment had encouraged 
excessively risky lending. The solution was to restrict competition through 
regulatory and self-regulatory controls.  The 1964 Banking Ordinance 
                                                        
10 For a review of the banking system see Schenk 2001.  
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introduced minimum reserve requirements against liabilities and restricted the 
share of loans that could be allocated to the stock market or property market and 
prohibited insider lending to bank directors.  Encouraged by incumbent banks, 
the state also imposed a moratorium on new bank licences in the same year, 
hoping both to restrict entry and to encourage foreign acquisition of local banks 
to improve their governance. 11  The Exchange Banks Association operated an 
Interest Rate Agreement that set maximum interest rates that could be offered 
for deposits, thus removing this form of competition.  Just as these controls were 
imposed, however, the demand for financial services in Southeast and East Asia 
began to increase.  
     Tight controls on the banking sector combined with increasing demand for 
financial services explains the increase in unregulated shadow banking in Hong 
Kong. With no new banking licences on offer, entrepreneurs opened non-bank 
financial companies that took deposits from the public, provided commercial and 
local property loans, traded in the local equity markets and offered consultancy 
services to companies in Hong Kong and the wider region seeking to raise 
capital.  They registered under the Companies Ordinance, but were not subject to 
the minimum capital or liquidity requirements of banks and therefore were 
essentially unregulated and unsupervised competitors that were able to operate 
on more profitable margins than the banks.12 By the early 1970s it was estimated 
that about 1500-2000 DTCs had opened in Hong Kong.13 At the same time, the 
                                                        
11 Schenk 2003. 
12 Shadow banking is now viewed as a threat to the stability of financial systems in many 
advanced and emerging economies, including China. Financial Stability Board 2012.  
13 Goodstadt 2007, 172. 
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monetary and financial system in Hong Kong also became much more liquid. 
Capital flowed into Hong Kong as a regional safe haven and monetary expansion 
was given a huge boost by innovations in the currency board that broke the 
monetary anchor to the US dollar in November 1974.14   
 
What were Deposit Taking Companies? 
There were several categories of finance company that accepted deposits from 
the public. Established local banks in Hong Kong opened DTC subsidiaries in 
order to evade the reserve requirements of the Banking Ordinance and the 
interest rate cartel.  Foreign banks opened DTCs to evade the moratorium on 
new bank licences. DTCs with foreign participation tended to be engaged in a 
mixture of local and offshore foreign currency lending. Most DTCs were not 
connected with licensed banks but still provided a range of local and 
international services.  All DTCs operated outside the Interest Rate Agreement 
when bidding for deposits, and were therefore in direct competition with 
commercial banks without the costly regulatory requirements of the Banking 
Ordinance.   
 
Trident International Finance Ltd is an example of a joint venture among three 
foreign banks; Barclays, Merrill Lynch and Nomura Securities. It opened in 1973, 
quickly building up a loan portfolio of US$20m by September 1974.  Trident’s 
annual report for 1975 claimed that ‘providing short term and medium term 
financing is one of Trident’s most important activities’ and it competed directly 
                                                        
14 Latter 2007.  Greenwood 2008.  Schenk 2009b. 
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with established banks for deposits.15  This DTC made losses in two out of its 
first three years of operation and Merrill Lynch sold its share to Barclays in 1976, 
by which time it had $15m in call deposits and $400m in time deposits with total 
assets of $472m. 
 
At the other extreme, were small sole proprietor-ships.  An example is Uptrend 
Finance Ltd., also opened in 1973, which appeared bankrupt in 1978 after 
allegedly fraudulent transactions with a property developing affiliate, Asia 
Lands.  Uptrend Finance Ltd was part of a group of three DTCs (including 
Aldwych Ltd. and Canwin Investments Ltd) controlled by Foong Weng Tat, the 
wealthy heir of the owner of Kwangtung Oil Co.16  Yee Kwok Kee was a director, 
and explained to investigators from the Financial Secretariat that: 
[H]e thought that since Foong Weng Tat was very rich, it would be 
harmless to become his business associate. So he quitted Hong Kong 
Chinese Bank for which he had worked for 17 years and formed Uptrend 
Finance Ltd with Foong.  Foong asked him to take care of Canwin and 
Aldwych for him as well. He agreed to this, seeing no harm in it. He did 
not know that Foong was a crook until the inquiry into Asia Lands. He 
said Foong gambled a lot, on commodities and in Macau.17 
Clearly a variety of firms came under the category of DTC.   
 
                                                        
15 Trident International Finance Co Ltd. 1975. 
16 Interview with J.T. Allen, 17 May 1978.  Hong Kong Public Record Office [hereafter HKRS] 54-
17-90-4. 
17 Interview with Yee Kwok Kee on 19 May 1978 HKRS 54-17-90-8. 
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Financial Secretary Cowperthwaite’s legacy to Haddon-Cave was a set of 
regulations that created loopholes for a large number of unsupervised and 
unregulated financial institutions.  The competition posed by DTCs soon led 
bankers to call on the state to force these companies onto a more equal footing. 
 
Deposit Taking Companies Regulation Debated 1973-1976 
In the first quarter of 1973 the Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate regime 
collapsed, global equity markets plummeted and in October 1973 the OPEC oil 
crisis struck, further destabilising international markets.  The repercussions in 
Hong Kong were severe with the dramatic boom and then collapse in share 
prices.  In early June 1973, JL Boyer at HSBC noted that competition from finance 
companies was drawing deposits out of the banking system and channelling 
them to the short term offshore market in Singapore, where rates were relatively 
attractive.  He called for a ‘short, forceful document explaining to Government 
that unless they take measures to put all financial institutions on the same 
footing as banks they are in grave danger of demonetising the Hong Kong dollar 
or, alternatively, raising the cost to industry so as to make them 
uncompetitive’.18  Two weeks later, the Interest Rate Agreement Sub-Committee 
increased the rates offered on deposits in Hong Kong by ¾% to stem the flow.   
 
The banks complained that DTCs threatened monetary and financial stability.  
With respect to the ‘mushrooming of finance companies which were not covered 
by the Banking Ordinance’ the chairman of the Interest Rate Sub-committee, 
                                                        
18 JL Boyer to Mike Sandberg, 4 June 1973, HSBC Group Archive [hereafter HSBC] GHO422. 
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Michael Sandberg of HSBC remarked that ‘the failure of any one small company 
could still have far reaching effects upon the Colony’s economy’. 19   He noted that 
previous efforts to curb them through the industry-government Banking 
Advisory Council had ‘been to no avail’.  Members of the Exchange Banks 
Association agreed collectively to send a strongly worded message to the 
Financial Secretary pointing out the dangers to the public and to the banking 
system from unregulated deposit taking companies.   
 
The bankers’ call for protection from competition was rebuffed by Haddon-Cave.  
He was less supportive of the Interest Rate Agreement or the moratorium on 
new bank licences than his predecessor (Cowperthwaite) and he hoped to 
encourage banks to compete for deposits to the benefit of their customers.20  But 
there was a public interest incentive for intervention.  The initial draft proposal 
for DTCs was called ‘Protection of Depositors Bill’ although Haddon-Cave was at 
pains to state in the Legislative Council ‘most emphatically’ that the final bill 
aimed to protect only small depositors and not ‘wealthy depositors of large 
amounts of money’.21  He sought to push DTCs out of the reach of small savers 
while allowing them to compete with established banks in large scale wholesale 
business.  Haddon-Cave’s resistance to the bankers’ pressure contradicts 
Goodstadt’s verdict that HSBC and other banks dominated the financial secretary 
                                                        
19 Minutes of Working Sub-Committee of the Hong Kong Interest Rate Agreement, 13 June 1973. 
HSBC GHO 422. 
20 Schenk 2009a, 169. 
21 Hong Kong Legislative Council Debates [hereafter LEGCO] 3 December 1975, p. 294-7.  
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before the 1980s currency and banking crises.22 But progress toward reform was 
checked when the stock market was rocked by a fresh crisis in mid-1973. 
 
The Secondary Banking Crisis in London at the end of 1973 gave fresh impetus to 
the dispute, when the Bank of England and leading clearing banks had to launch 
the collective Lifeboat to support illiquid DTCs in London.  This episode made it 
clear that DTCs could destabilise even the sophisticated London market.23  To 
make Hong Kong’s DTCs more robust, Sandberg (HSBC) suggested minimum 
capital requirements (he proposed $10m or half of that of banks) and restricting 
them to deposits of 12 months or over (rather than Haddon-Cave’s suggestion of 
3 months).24  These limits favoured HSBC’s own DTC subsidiary, Wardley, which 
was by far the largest company in the DTC sector. 
 
The first iteration of Hong Kong’s current Three Tiered Banking System 
(eventually introduced in September 1981) came out of this debate.  Ockendon, 
the Banking Commissioner, devised a scheme to distinguish ‘limited licensed 
banks’ from ‘full licensed banks’ and established a third category of ‘Registered 
Finance Companies’. 25  No new full banking licenses would be issued ‘in the 
foreseeable future’ but there would now be an opportunity for new institutions 
to enter the wholesale market without competing with incumbents in the retail 
                                                        
22 Goodstadt 2005, 190. 
23 Reid 1982. 
24 Sandberg to Haddon-Cave, 30 January 1974. HSBC, Chairman’s Papers, Papers for Banking 
Advisory Committee 1974. 
25 Minutes of the BAC, 28 June 1974.  HSBC, Minutes of Banking Advisory Committee 1974. 
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market by restricting the minimum size of deposit. Ghose has suggested that the 
main rationale for the introduction of the three-tiered system in 1981 was the 
need to enforce the interest rate agreement, given that interest rates were a 
more important monetary tool once the exchange rate was floating.26  This was 
clearly not the rationale for the development of the scheme in the summer of 
1974, when the exchange rate was still fixed to the dollar and Haddon-Cave was 
critical of the interest rate agreement.  But Ockendon’s plan was in the end 
postponed in the maelstrom of global market instability and the float of the HK 
dollar in November 1974. The time was not ripe for a dramatic restructuring of 
the Hong Kong banking system. 
 
Schenk has described 18 months of negotiation between Ockendon, Haddon-
Cave, banks and DTCs that culminated in new legislation that formalised the 
operations of DTCs in January 1976.27   The 1976 Deposit Taking Companies Act 
required DTCs to register, to show  that they had minimum paid up capital of 
HK$2.5 million (equiv. US$500,000 – one quarter of HSBC’s proposal) and 
prohibited them from accepting deposits smaller than HK$50,000 (equiv. 
$US10,000).  The law was clearly aimed at protecting small depositors from 
accessing unsupervised institutions, but still left the DTCs able to compete with 
banks for large deposits.  DTCs had no statutory liquidity requirements nor 
prudential supervision.  When putting the Bill to the Legislative Council in 
November 1975, Haddon-Cave cited John Bremridge (his successor as Financial 
Secretary in 1981) that ‘the extent to which any Government should legislate to 
                                                        
26 Ghose 1987, 80-81. 
27 Schenk 2009a, 170-71. 
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prevent a fool and his money from being easily parted is open to a wide ranging 
philosophical debate.  We are not via this bill trying to legislate for the complete 
protection of all fools’.28  In 1976, 176 DTCs were registered and the number 
climbed steadily.  Haddon-Cave had successfully fought off calls from the 
Exchange Banks’ Association to put the DTCs on an equal footing with banks and 
instead focused on protecting small depositors rather than constraining 
competition in the investment and commercial markets.  This was in line with his 
concept of positive non-interventionism, but the new system was soon under 
pressure. 
 
On-going Battle for Control of DTCs 1978-81 
The first rumbles of instability in the DTC sector began in November 1978. 
Confidence in Sun Hung Kai Finance Company was rocked by losses reported by 
its sister company SHK Securities (17% owned by Paribas).  Also in this business 
group was an insurance company and a property developer (Sun Hung Kai 
Properties Ltd).  The situation was only stabilised through a line of credit from 
SHK Finance Company’s major shareholders; HSBC, Bank of China and Paribas.   
This episode should have raised prudential concerns about interlinked financial 
and property companies and insider lending using deposits from the public, but 
these were not the focus of Haddon-Cave’s reforms. 
 
Instead, the crisis prompted reconsideration of the minimum deposit threshold 
to further restrict public access to DTCs, but this appeared ‘unfair’ on those 
                                                        
28 LEGCO, 5 November 1975, p. 190. Bremridge made these comments on 30 July 1975 to argue 
for a commodities exchange in Hong Kong. 
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foreign banks that had opened DTCs in Hong Kong to contribute to the 
development of the international financial centre.  If they were to leave, the 
Banking Advisory Committee warned that this would undermine the reputation 
of this important part of Hong Kong’s economy.29  Haddon-Cave was torn 
between protecting incumbent banks and the newly established foreign-focused 
DTC sector.  Instead, he chose a modest enhancement in prudential supervision 
of DTCs so that from the end of 1978 the (now re-named) Banking and DTC 
Commissioner required monthly balance sheet returns, and consolidated data 
for the industry as a whole started to be published in the Hong Kong Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin.  However, physical inspections of DTCs did not begin until 
January 1980, delayed by the recruitment and training of staff.  In June 1980, (in 
a speech entitled ‘Caveat Emptor’) Bank Commissioner Colin Martin admitted 
publicly that he had no discretion over who successfully registered a DTC so long 
as they complied with the basic legal requirements.30  Three months later, Martin 
reported to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in Switzerland that 
although there were 150 staff in his office, this was not sufficient to inspect the 
DTCs effectively and that ‘it will be some time before we are able to recruit and 
train sufficient staff to enable us to be confident that we are adequately 
supervising the activities of the 300 [Deposit Taking] companies on the 
                                                        
29 Reported in letter from Peter Graham, to Haddon-Cave 3 July 1980. HSBC Asia-Pacific Archive 
[hereafter HSBC AP], Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 196/088 Carton II. Also noted in C.P. 
Mann and B.S.P Gent, Report on Banking Supervision in Hong Kong, April 1984. Bank of England 
Archives [hereafter BE], 11A62/1. 
30 ‘Caveat Emptor’, Speech by Banking Commissioner at the Rotary Club of Hong Kong on 10 June 
1980. 
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register.’31  A gap was emerging between statutory requirements and their 
implementation because of the lack of resources allocated to supervision. 
 
From 1979-1981 a surge in liquidity in the Hong Kong market resulted in a 
dramatic increase in credit and a property boom.  In this context, incumbent 
banks launched a fresh campaign to tighten up the regulation and supervision of 
DTCs.  In August 1979 Sandberg told Haddon-Cave that HSBC and ‘the older and 
more public-spirited members of the Exchange Banks’ Association’ had been 
trying to restrain credit, but ‘we cannot much longer sit idly by watching our 
business being snatched from us by organisations with a weaker commitment to 
the well-being of Hong Kong’.32  He urged Haddon-Cave to put a ceiling on banks 
and DTCs borrowing abroad to stem the capital inflow, but Haddon-Cave 
resisted.  Peter Graham of Chartered Bank claimed that ‘as a matter of basic 
principle, Standard Chartered Bank has always stood in favour of a competitive 
atmosphere and against monopoly constraints’, but he also warned Haddon-Cave 
that ‘one has to ask whether they [independent DTCs not linked to banks] are 
really performing a useful function or whether they are fuelling speculation’.33 
Haddon-Cave’s unwillingness to act clearly frustrated both HSBC and Chartered 
                                                        
31 Memo by Martin, September 1980, Bank for International Settlements Archive, Offshore 
Centres Meeting of Supervisors BS/80/41e5. 
32 Sandberg to Haddon-Cave 18 August 1979.  HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
33 P. Graham to Haddon-Cave, 3 July 1980. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 196/088 
Carton II. 
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Bank, and they returned to the charge six months later as their deposit base 
eroded further. 
 
At a lunch with Haddon-Cave in January 1981, Thomas Welsh (HSBC’s General 
Manager Hong Kong) renewed the bank’s arguments about the dangers of DTCs 
and sent a follow up memorandum setting out HSBC’s position.34  The memo 
noted that about one quarter of Hong Kong deposits were with DTCs, and he 
expected they would come to dominate the domestic market before long.   Welsh 
predicted dire consequences for Hong Kong’s international reputation if 
unregulated DTCs exploited their advantageous cost position and ability to 
compete with banks for deposits outside the interest rate agreement to dominate 
the financial system.  Welsh estimated that between 80-90% of DTC deposits 
were short term, while most lending was over 5-10 years and ‘this, clearly is a 
classic formula for financial instability – as was demonstrated during the 
secondary-banking crisis in the United Kingdom in 1974.  Unless something is 
done soon, a secondary-banking crisis in Hong Kong seems inevitable.  It follows 
that the longer remedial measures are delayed, the greater will be the crisis’. 35   
The memo concluded dramatically that ‘it is clear that some measures are 
immediately necessary to stem the growth of DTCs and to retain for the banks 
their primary and central role in the financial economy of the Colony.  Only by 
                                                        
34 T. Welsh to Haddon-Cave, 16 January 1981.  HSBC AP Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
35 Ibid 
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these measures can the financial stability of the Colony be assured and the 
expansion in money supply brought under some sort of control.’36 
 
HSBC was not the only bank lobbying Haddon-Cave.   At the end of January 1981, 
as deposits shifted from banks to DTCs, Peter Graham, Group Managing Director 
for Chartered Bank wrote to Haddon-Cave from London also protesting about 
the ‘continuing rapid and unregulated growth of DTCs in Hong Kong and at the 
threat which this poses to the financial stability of the Colony and its longer term 
development’.37   He had three areas of concern; first over-expansion of the 
money supply, and secondly the premise that ‘many of the DTCs are commercial 
banks in thin disguise, conducting a whole-sale and corporate business’, lending 
at prime rate in competition with banks but funding though the money market so 
that ‘they are liable to severe financial hazards through interest exposure’.  
Thirdly, there was no regulation to ensure prudent maturity transformation 
between deposits and lending or capital adequacy to cover the risk exposures 
and ‘general over-trading tendencies’.  Like Welsh, he also raised the spectre of 
the Secondary Banking crisis in London in 1974.  He warned that 
‘proportionately, the problem in Hong Kong could be much worse because of the 
larger share of total deposits that have been attracted into the money market 
and to the DTCs’. 38  Mike Sandberg, Chairman of HSBC, followed up in early 
February 1981, noting that ‘there may be room for argument in the saying that 
                                                        
36 Ibid. 
37 Letter from P. Graham to P. Haddon-Cave, 30 January 1981, HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 
1983-86. HKO 196/088 Carton II. 
38 Ibid. 
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slow horses and fast women lead to personal ruin…but there is no disputing the 
adage that borrowing short and lending long is a sure way to corporate 
disaster’.39  He called on Haddon-Cave to reconsider the redefinition of banking 
to push DTCs out of the short term deposit market. 
 
Despite these repeated representations from the leading banks in the Colony, 
Haddon-Cave was resolute in resisting further intervention. His immediate 
response to Sandberg was to accept that redefining banking along the lines of 
Ockendon’s proposals ‘has been, either a non-subject…or such an awkward 
subject as to be unmentionable (which may or may not amount to 
procrastination, but it has certainly involved much cantankerous argument)’.40 
He later remarked that Graham’s letter had raised his blood pressure and gently 
rebuked Sandberg’s and Graham’s contention that the DTCs’ practices of 
borrowing short and lending long were dangerous by quoting from a Citicorp 
and Citibank booklet that asserted that this ‘gapping’ (maturity transformation) 
was the very source of bank profits, although it needed to be carefully 
managed.41 Haddon-Cave added that while he felt ’fairly certain that if [the DTC 
Commissioner] thought any DTC was gapping on too large a scale and, therefore, 
the liquidity risk it was taking was too high that he would take steps to have the 
                                                        
39 Sandberg to Haddon-Cave, 2 February 1981. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
40 Haddon-Cave to Sandberg, 3 February 1981. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
41 Haddon-Cave to Sandberg 16 February 1981.  HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
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position corrected.’  Given that the Martin had confessed that his officers were 
unable to supervise adequately, this was an optimistic claim.  Haddon-Cave went 
on to suggest, as he had in the 1970s, that ‘Is it not possible that the banks are 
losing business to the DTCs because your spreads between borrowing and 
lending rates are too high?’42 Consistent with his model of non-intervention, 
Haddon-Cave remained averse to anti-competitive measures.  But rising 
inflationary pressure soon turned him to new reforms to defend his indirect 
control over interest rates, which he considered the main tool of monetary 
policy.43      
 
An investigation in early 1981 showed that banks were using their associated 
DTCs to offer high rates to attract deposits that were then loaned on to the 
parent bank, thereby evading efforts to constrain the growth of the money 
supply.44   On 17 March 1981, the DTC Commissioner suspended all new 
registrations, since the number had increased by about 61 in the previous year, 
bringing the total to 330. 45  The moratorium was subsequently relaxed for DTCs 
50% owned by licensed banks on the basis that since the parent institution was 
                                                        
42 Ibid. 
43 LEGCO, 29 April 1981. Pp. 810-12. 
44 In February 1981, 94 (out of 342) DTCs were subsidiaries or associated with banks and that 
these DTCs held 77% of DTC deposits and deposited 70% of these funds with banks. LEGCO, 29 
April 1981. Pp. 811. In fact, the Financial Secretary overestimated the power of deposit interest 
rates to constrain monetary growth in an open economy, but this was how he justified new 
regulation. Greenwood 2008, 66-70. 
45 HSBC Hong Kong Economic Report, May 1981. HSBC GHO 421 Confidential Correspondence 
with Financial Secretary etc. 
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supervised by the authorities, it could be trusted that the operations of the 
subsidiary were secure.  But, the greater freedom for licensed banks to open 
DTC’s increased the vulnerability of the retail banking system to risks in the 
wholesale market and promoted the evasion of the interest rate agreement by 
these banks. Clearly the moratorium did not halt growth in the sector since a 
further 17 DTCs had registered by July 1981.   
 
In April 1981, Haddon-Cave introduced a new DTC Bill and a new Banking Bill to 
restructure the industry along the lines of the Three-Tiered System, seven years 
after it was first proposed by Ockendon.  A new category of ‘licensed’ DTC had 
higher minimum capital and higher minimum deposits but could compete with 
banks for short term deposits.  Other DTCs were pushed out of the short term 
demand deposit market and the banks regained their local funding base.  But the 
wholesale business of DTCs was not deemed to require prudential liquidity 
requirements to cover losses.  Wealthy people depositing large sums were 
expected to exercise caution or pay the consequences of unwise investments.  At 
the same time the minimum paid up capital for locally incorporated banks was 
increased from $10 million to $100 million.46 The details are summarised in 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
46 At the time, 23 locally incorporated banks fell below this threshold but were given two years to 
comply.  LEGCO, 13 May 1980.p. 856. 
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Table 1:  Three Tiered System September 1981 
 Licensed Banks Licensed DTC Registered DTC 
Minimum Paid Up 
Capital 
$100m  $75m ($100m 
issued) 
$10m 
Deposit Minimum 
Term 
No restriction No restriction 3-months 
Deposit Minimum 
Size 
No restriction $500,000 $50,000  
Liquidity 
Requirements 
25% of assets in 
specified liquid 
assets 
Nil until 1 Sept. 
1986 (then 25%) 
Nil until 1 Sept. 
1986 (then 
25%) 
 
John Bremridge was appointed Financial Secretary from June 1981. Bremridge 
had been Chairman of John Swires Group and on the board of HSBC, and he was 
the first Financial Secretary who was not a career civil servant.  In 1975 
Bremridge was publically critical of the government’s delayed efforts to stem the 
stock exchange boom and bust of 1973, noting that ‘minimum interference 
nevertheless does not mean no interference at all’.47  In a speech to the Hong 
Kong Association of Banks in August 1981, just before the new framework was 
implemented, Bremridge embraced non-interventionism but warned that the 
light hand of the state depended on bankers themselves exercising prudence in 
the creation of credit: 
‘let me say that while I share Sir Philip [Haddon-Cave]’s commitment to non-
interventionism, I would add my own firm belief in the corollary – the exercise 
of prudent freedom, which for your industry inter alia touches upon your 
freedom to create credit’.48 
                                                        
47 LEGCO, 30 July 1975, p. 950. 
48 Speech by John Bremridge at the dinner of the Hong Kong Association of Banks, 11 August 
1981. HSBC GHO 421 Confidential Correspondence with Financial Secretary etc. 
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He went on to explain that non-interventionism was not merely an economic 
philosophy, but rather reflected his lack of faith in the ability of governments to 
curb market risk effectively: 
I accept that a persuasive argument against intervention is not that in 
many cases is not philosophically decent, but that governments often 
cannot predict accurately what the end effects of new controls will be. 
The world indeed is littered with economic disasters created by well-
meaning interference with those free market mechanisms which have 
served Hong Kong so well.49  
The new framework for DTC regulation was to prove just such a case. 
Bremridge’s comments ‘emboldened’ Sandberg, who quickly wrote to try again 
to get controls on bank and DTC foreign borrowing.50  He noted that  ‘I myself 
would be the last person to find fault with the basic philosophy of non-
intervention’ but that ‘inactivity by Government on this front [credit expansion] 
could result in its being regarded as an ally to the speculative and irresponsible 
ambitions of our entrepreneurs, to the detriment of the longer-term interests of 
Hong Kong’.  Bremridge rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would 
discriminate against foreign banks and DTCs, which relied more on international 
liquidity, and that it would also damage Hong Kong’s reputation ‘as a financial 
centre based on stable policies’.51 William C.L. Brown of Chartered Bank also 
                                                        
49 Ibid. 
50 Sandberg to Bremridge, 24 August 1981. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 196/088 
Carton II. He suggested instead that banks and DTCs hold 10% of liquid assets as cash. 
51 Bremridge to Sandberg, 3 September 1981. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 
196/088 Carton II. 
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wrote to Bremridge, but he preferred relying on interest rates to curtail credit 
creation, noting that ‘like Sandberg I endorse a non-intervention policy, but if 
Government does have to intervene then it is vital the effects are confined to the 
target area’.52 
 
Squeezing the DTCs out of the retail deposit sector happened just as the 
monetary expansion of the previous two years came to an end with a contraction 
in credit and a collapse of property prices.  This left both the DTCs and the 
banking system in an illiquid, fragile situation.  In addition, in February 1982 the 
government agreed to remove the 10% tax on interest earned from foreign 
deposits, further adding to the incentive to switch out of Hong Kong dollar 
deposits.   The environment was ripe for a further round of crisis. 
 
Impact of the Three-Tiered System 
The minimum capital requirements did not come into force until 30 June 1983, 
and only a few failed to meet the requirements by this date.53 The first new 
licensed DTC was Baring Brothers Asia Ltd in February 1982 and by the end of 
1983 there were 29 Licensed DTCs (all subsidiaries of local and foreign banks) 
compared with 350 Registered DTCs.  The Three Tiered System was among 
Haddon-Cave’s last major contributions as Financial Secretary. 
 
                                                        
52 Ibid. 
53 6 DTCs had their licenses revoked in June 1983 because they did not meet the minimum capital 
requirements.  A further 86 DTCs met the requirements between April and June 1983. Database 
Finance 1983, Database Asia. 
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Figure 1 shows that the number of DTCs almost doubled in the 3 years from the 
end of 1978, but the 1981 framework slowed the number of new registrations. 
 
Source: Hong Kong Digest of Monthly Statistics. 
 
Figure 2 shows that the majority of registered DTCs in 1980 were at the small 
end of the distribution, almost half with shareholders’ funds less than HK$10 
million (c.USD2 million) and just over one fifth of institutions with HK$5 million 
or less at a time when minimum paid up capital was HK$2.5 million.54  Among 
the smallest were DTCs associated with local and overseas banks (such as Kwong 
On Finance Ltd., OCBC Finance (Asia), JP Morgan (HK) Ltd.).  These subsidiaries 
would have had the resources of their parent company to draw on in case of 
liquidity problems.  The largest DTC by far was the HSBC subsidiary Wardley Ltd 
                                                        
54 Asian Money Manager 1980.  Shareholders’ funds include paid up capital, capital reserves and 
revenue reserves. 
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with paid up capital of HK$250 million, shareholders’ funds of HK$388m and 
total assets of HK$5.515 billion. 
 
Source: Directory of Deposit-taking Companies in Hong Kong, Asian Money 
Manager, 1980 and 1983 
 
It is clear from Figure 3 that DTCs were very successful in attracting deposits 
away from the formal banking sector until September 1981. Almost all of the 
increase in deposits was in Hong Kong dollars, thus directly competing with 
banks in the home market.  After the restrictions on duration and size of deposit 
in September 1981, retail deposits flowed back to banks, and the share of DTCs 
in total assets and liabilities subsided to about 30%.  After being pushed out of 
the Hong Kong market, DTCs shifted toward attracting foreign currency deposits, 
particularly from foreign banks.  It is clear that the September 1981 reforms 
changed the business model for the DTCs from the domestic market to the 
offshore market just when risks in global capital market were about to intensify. 
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Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
 
Figure 4 shows that registered DTCs were more concentrated in foreign currency 
loans and advances than banks or licensed DTCs.  At the end of 1980 half of all 
loans and advances for use outside Hong Kong were from DTCs, rising to a peak 
of 59% at the time of the financial crisis of September 1982 before steadily 
declining to 28% by 1986. 
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Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics 
 
It is clear from these data that the Three-Tiered system did affect the financial 
sector, but not necessarily in ways that improved resilience.  DTC’s balance 
sheets remained about 30% of total financial institutions in Hong Kong, but they 
were increasingly driven to overseas markets and inter-bank funding while they 
operated with only minimal supervision. 
 
DTC-Bank links and the 1982 Crisis 
Despite Haddon-Cave’s hopes, the new framework did not allow the state to 
stabilise either inflation or the banking system.  The crisis, when it came, can be 
traced back to institutions in the deeper shadow; the gold market.  A prominent 
chain of retail gold shops, Tse Lee Yuen Jewellery, with 10 branches, accepted 
deposits against gold certificates (future claims of physical gold). The company 
used these funds to speculate in the gold market but losses were accumulated by 
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selling low at a time when the gold price increased in August 1982.  When 
customers sought to withdraw their deposits the company’s insolvency was 
revealed.   Hang Lung Bank was the firm’s bankers and they began to close 
overdraft accounts to recapture liquidity. This signal prompted a crisis of 
confidence among depositors and a run on the bank in September 1982, which 
coincided with political uncertainty as Prime Minister Thatcher arrived to 
negotiate the return of Hong Kong to China.55  Chartered Banks’s promise to 
provide Hang Lung with liquidity eventually stemmed the run, but the market 
remained fragile.     
 
A few months later, in November 1982, a prominent DTC, Dollar Credit and 
Financing Ltd, was closed after 10 years of operation with liabilities of c. K$650m 
to 39 mainly foreign banks and other DTCs.  This DTC had expanded quickly in 
the absence of liquidity requirements; in June 1980 it reported total assets of 
HK$380k against shareholders’ funds of only HK$60,000 including paid up 
capital of only HK$30,000.  Dollar Credit had close links to Hang Lung Bank; its 
board of directors included 2 directors of Hang Lung Bank and it was located on 
the 13th floor of the Hang Lung Bank Building in Causeway Bay.56   Illiquidity 
again spread to the commercial bank sector and Hang Lung Bank (with 28 
branches) was soon in difficulty again.  In June 1983 Chartered Bank denied 
further support and the government had to use the Exchange Fund to take over 
the bank on 27 September 1983 in the midst of a collapse in the HK$.  In the 
ensuing months, several property companies such as Eda and Carrian suffered 
                                                        
55 Kynaston and Roberts 2015.   
56 Barings Securities 1987, 27.   
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from cash flow problems as property prices fell and their associated DTCs 
(including HSBC’s Wardley) faltered.57  The unwillingness of Chartered Bank to 
continue to provide liquidity to Hang Lung shifted the lender of last resort 
directly to the Exchange Fund.   
 
Once again, non-interventionism was challenged by HSBC.  Just after the Dollar 
Credit DTC debacle at the end of 1982, Sandberg revived his proposals to curb 
banks and DTCs from borrowing overseas, but Bremridge resisted, concluding 
rather fatalistically that ‘”when in doubt, do nothing” seems the least foolish 
policy for Government’. 58  In February 1983, J.M. Gray of HSBC noted that while 
foreign banks and DTCs were not the only sources of excessive credit, ‘they led 
the way, encouraged by Government’s policy on land sales and the absence of 
effective liquidity controls.’59  He also claimed DTCs were not amenable to moral 
suasion to constrain lending in the way that local banks were, and that ‘they 
[DTCs] were under heavy pressure from their Head Offices to cover their 
overheads as quickly as possible. They soon discovered that the fastest way to do 
this was to take on property loans, undercutting the local banks’ spreads – and 
fuelling further credit expansion in the process – in order to secure the business. 
Reluctantly, the local banks had little choice but to follow’.60  Clearly Gray blamed 
                                                        
57 Kynaston and Roberts 2015. 
58 Financial Secretary to Sandberg, 29 December 1982.  HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. 
HKO 196/088 Carton II. 
59 JM Gray to Chairman, 21 February 1983. HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 196/088 
Carton II. 
60 Ibid. 
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the deterioration of market discipline on the DTCs.  Sandberg concurred and 
complained to Bremridge ‘If I may be bold enough to say so, I feel the real 
stumbling block is one of doctrine and I believe if the Government can steel 
themselves to accept the principle of some form of monetary control it would not 
be too difficult’ to adopt Sandberg’s suggested controls. 
 
After the government was forced to bail out Hang Lung Bank, Bremridge 
summoned advisers from the Bank of England’s supervision team (C.L. Mann and 
Brian Gent); they prepared a secret 50 page report in April 1984, which was very 
critical of the processes operating in Hong Kong. 61  Even after the carefully 
negotiated 1981 Banking and DTC Ordinances, there were serious weaknesses in 
the regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Mann and Gent were particularly 
critical of the Banking and DTC Commissioners’ office for sticking too strictly to 
their remit of ‘mere technical compliance’ with the governing ordinance and not 
concerning themselves with the quality of assets and management and thus 
failing to identify ‘bad, imprudent or indeed fraudulent management’ as a ‘major 
task of supervision generally’. 
Faced with a steady rise in the value of security on the back of a booming 
economy and the generally pervasive attitude in Hong Kong in favour of 
minimal intervention in the interests of the benefits of free enterprise, it 
is perhaps not too surprising that the view came to be held – as it seems 
widely to be in the banking community – that it was not the job of 
                                                        
61 C.P. Mann and Brian S.P Gent, Report on Banking Supervision in Hong Kong, April 1984. BE, 
11A62/1. 
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supervision to delve too deeply into the purposes of loans nor the reality 
with which the requirements of the Ordinances were actually being met.62 
Even when ‘faced with identified shortcomings in the management system of 
individual banks, examiners feel able to do little more than to complain to bank 
management and to hope that matters will be improved before the next 
examination’. After the expensive Hang Lung collapse, the Bank/DTC 
Commissioner had not led any investigation of his office’s operations to 
determine how to improve prudential control of banks.  Indeed, the 
Commissioner did not routinely see the reports on individual institutions; they 
were summarised by senior bank examiners and then reported to the Assistant 
Commissioner.  Mann and Gent also noted ‘a general reluctance at senior 
management level [within the Commissioner’s office] to record any of the critical 
meetings which take place with bank management.’ 
 
Their other main recommendation was that DTCs should have minimum capital 
requirements somewhat higher than the banks (15% rather than 10%) although 
capital adequacy was ‘generally more of an art than a science’ because it 
depended on both the riskiness of assets and the quality of management.   
 
Most ambitiously, Mann and Gent recommended that all DTCs should re-register 
and prove their sound management as well as capitalisation to get rid of 
unsound incumbent DTCs.  It was expected that the 79 DTCs owned by foreign 
banks would be able to achieve this threshold without difficulty.  They believed 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
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the 36 DTCs associated with local banks were only in business to evade the 
interest rate agreement, so if interest rates were liberalised on deposits over 
HK$50,000 then these DTCs would lose their raison d’etre and disappear quietly.  
The real target was the 115 independently owned DTCs, which the Bank of 
England advisors ‘believe[d] bring few benefits to Hong Kong to offset the risk 
many of them pose to her reputation’.  
 
These proposals met with a mixed reception in Hong Kong, although further 
reform began to be discussed.  In the meantime the government formally took 
over three failed banks and provided financial assistance to facilitate take-overs 
for four others.  After two years of negotiations with banks and DTCs, Bremridge 
announced a new Banking Bill in March 1986.  It first set a wider remit for the 
Commissioner to ensure the honesty and prudence of DTC and bank 
management in words that closely followed the Bank of England’s 1984 
recommendation.63  The Bill also adopted the Bank of England advisors’ 
suggestions on liquidity and capital adequacy, although at lower thresholds than 
they had recommended.  Breaches of capital requirements were not an offence, 
but only required to be reported to the Commissioner.  The result was a decline 
in DTC share of assets and a gradual reduction in the number of DTCs as their 
advantages over banks contracted. 
 
The final reading of the Banking Bill marked Bremridge’s last appearance in the 
Legislative Council after 12 years as a member (5 years as Financial Secretary).  
                                                        
63 Bremridge speech LEGCO, 19 March 1986. P. 771. 
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Goodstadt (2007, 179) describes Bremridge’s term in office as a journey from 
being ‘a stout ally’ of colonial non-interventionism to ‘a thorough-going 
reformer, introducing legislation to restore prudence and integrity to the 
financial markets that marked a clear break with the cynicism and compromises 
of the past’. Certainly the archive evidence shows he was resolute in resisting 
pressure from HSBC to impose controls on foreign borrowing, but his reforms, 
when they came, originated in the Bank of England (the colonial metropole), 
took two years to come to fruition and were tempered by 171 amendments at 
Committee stage.64 
 
Conclusions 
Hong Kong’s politicians have repeatedly declared the end of Positive Non-
Interventionism, although the academic literature has pointed to the 
inconsistent application of this core principle of Hong Kong’s economic policy.  
Previous studies have mainly focused on administration of social and labour 
policies while the financial sector is traditionally viewed as more influenced by 
free market forces.  Even here, however, the rationale of public interest in cases 
of market failure drew the state into regulation. This paper has traced the 
reluctant and incremental nature of this intervention and shown how this 
approach created incentives for evasion of regulations that further destabilised 
the system.  It has also shown how positive non-interventionism was negotiated 
between Financial Secretaries and incumbent banking interests, particularly (but 
not exclusively) HSBC and Chartered Bank.  The bankers themselves persistently 
                                                        
64 Bremridge speech LEGCO, 19 March 1986. P. 771.  The final form of the Bill also watered down 
several proposed areas of the Commissioner’s powers, e.g. over directors of banks. 
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urged greater intervention to protect their competitive position, to promote 
financial stability or to curb inflation.  Not surprisingly, these motivations often 
over-lapped. The Financial Secretaries developed their own ideological positions 
that guided their attitudes to the pressures from banks for more intervention, 
but these ideologies were then challenged by successive banking crises. 
 
From the 1960s to the 1980s each Financial Secretary had to face financial crises 
that challenged the non-interventionist stance of the government and each left a 
legacy of new regulations for his successor to implement.  The banking crises of 
the 1960s forced Cowperthwaite to abandon his complete ‘Laissez-Faire’ 
approach by introducing minimal prudential rules for banks in the 1964 Banking 
Ordinance, supporting self-regulation through the Interest Rate Agreement and 
protecting incumbent banks through the moratorium on new licenses.  But this 
had the perverse effect of promoting a fringe sector of dangerous competitors.   
 
Haddon-Cave then struggled to preserve ‘positive non-interventionism’ under 
pressure from the banking community.  In March 1981, on the eve of presenting 
the bill setting up the Three-Tiered System and 3 months before his departure 
from office, he remarked to the famous Hong Kong entrepreneur Li Ka-shing:  
‘the way in which so many in the market place, in these scratchy times, 
damn us if we even suggest something and simultaneously damn us if we 
do nothing is beginning to get me down! I am determined, for as long as I 
am here, to keep the economy, and all the markets within it, free and that 
means free from unnecessary and clumsy Government intervention, free 
from fiscal discrimination, free from the stifling effects of excessive 
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taxation and an over-large public sector and free from all other influences 
which inhibit competitive forces.’65   
While the financial sector boomed under the opportunities that this new 
environment offered, it threatened the interests of both the public and 
incumbent banks.   
 
Bremridge embraced positive non-interventionism with a call to banks to act 
prudently under the new framework, but he too was quickly under pressure 
from HSBC and Chartered Bank to introduce new controls even before the Three-
Tiered System came into force.  He resisted their suggestions, in the belief that 
they were discriminatory, would undermine Hong Kong’s reputation for open 
stable policy, and could not be relied on to be effective.  He then presided over a 
surge of liquidity, a rash of fraud scandals and bank failures before finally 
introducing prudential regulations for DTCs in his last appearance in the 
Legislative Council in 1986.  This finally closed most of the loopholes served by 
DTCs; by 2016 there were only 18 DTCs and 24 Restricted License Banks. 
 
The evidence presented here also demonstrates the importance of assessing the 
practice as well as form of intervention.  The Banking Commissioner’s office was 
under-resourced and struggled to perform its supervisory duties while a culture 
of minimal inspection developed that allowed weak governance and poor 
management to infect the financial sector.  The inadequate resource devoted to 
                                                        
65 Letter from Haddon-Cave to Li Ka-shing, 11 March 1981.  Italics underlined in the original. 
HSBC AP, Financial Secretary, 1983-86. HKO 196/088 Carton II. 
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supervision was identified within the commissioner’s office in the early 1980s 
and by the Bank of England in the wake of another round of bank failures. 
 
The international financial centre in Hong Kong survived the turmoil of the 
1980s and by the time of the return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 it had 
become the territory’s main economic activity.  The evidence has shown that the 
role of the state was highly contested during the period when Haddon-Cave 
developed his approach of positive non-interventionism, and that he himself felt 
embattled by bankers’ pressure for greater regulation.  His interactions with 
bankers show that he was not ignorant about the functioning of the banking 
system, but rather took a principled stance to minimise regulation and promote 
competition, but at the same time his stance facilitated weak supervision that 
contributed to instability.  Under Bremridge, the concept evolved toward ‘when 
in doubt, do nothing’, based on his view that state intervention often made 
matters worse; he then presided over a costly banking crisis.  It seems likely 
from the archival evidence that the financial sector flourished despite weak and 
incremental regulation and supervision rather than as a direct result of the light 
hand of the state. 
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